have become one of the key security issues of the twenty-ªrst century.
ally reinforcing and make biological weapons even more dangerous than suggested by assessments based solely on potential lethality.
The article begins with an examination of the major characteristics of pathogens as weapons. The next four sections assess the security implications of biological weapons in four key areas of concern for international securityproliferation, deterrence, civil-military relations, and threat assessment-and suggest the following conclusions. First, it is extremely difªcult to prevent the spread of biological warfare capabilities to actors motivated by a desire to challenge the status quo. Second, biological weapons do not confer the deterrent beneªts associated with nuclear weapons and pose special difªculties for states seeking to prevent their use. Third, the intense secrecy that shrouds biological warfare programs impedes civilian control over them. Fourth, states tend to have ºawed assessments of the biological warfare capabilities and intentions of their opponents. A common theme throughout this article is that secrecy produces a variety of destabilizing effects: Not only does it impede veriªcation, but it also undermines deterrence, hinders civilian oversight, and signiªcantly complicates threat assessments.
9 After addressing potential objections to this analysis, I offer several policy prescriptions for reducing the biological weapons threat.
Pathogens as Weapons
Modern biological weapons are designed to disseminate pathogens or toxins in an aerosol cloud of microscopic particles that can be readily inhaled and retained in the lungs of the exposed population.
10 These aerosols are most effective when composed of particles ranging from 1 to 10 microns that can stay airborne longer and cause more severe cases of disease.
11 Aerosols are taste-less, odorless, and invisible, thus facilitating clandestine attacks. They can be generated either by bomblets loaded into cluster bombs or missile warheads or by spraying devices that are mounted on aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, ships, or vehicles, or that are carried by hand. 12 The key drawbacks to biological weapons include their delayed effects; their sensitivity to environmental and meteorological conditions, which could result in uncertain area coverage and effects; the risk of infecting friendly forces; and the prospect of long-term contamination. For example, wind speed and direction, humidity, atmospheric stability, and the presence of sunlight can all inºuence the performance of a biological weapon. 13 The careful selection of agents, delivery systems, and targets, however, as well as the timing of the attack, could compensate for most of these limitations.
14
The offense-defense balance in biological warfare strongly favors the attacker because developing and using biological weapons to cause casualties is signiªcantly easier and less expensive than developing and ªelding defenses against them.
15 Whether the biotechnology revolution will strengthen the defender or allow attackers to maintain their edge in this competition is unknown. 16 The most common method of operationalizing the offense-defense balance is to construct a cost ratio of offense to defense: the more resources the attacker must invest to overcome the defender's investment in defensive forces, the greater the shift in the balance toward defense. 17 Qualitative factors that affect the ease of attack or defense are also important. Four factors help to determine the attacker's advantage in biological warfare: (1) the potency of biological weapons, (2) the diversity of threat agents, (3) the ease of surprise, and (4) the difªculty in defending against such an attack.
the potency of biological weapons Biological weapons combine a relatively low cost of production with the capability for infecting large numbers of people over a wide area. According to a 1969 United Nations study, the cost of causing one civilian casualty per square kilometer was about $2,000 with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, $600 with chemical weapons, and only $1 with biological weapons.
18
The ability of biological weapons to cause mass casualties is well documented. A 1970 World Health Organization (WHO) study found that 50 kilograms of anthrax could result in 200,000 casualties in a medium-sized city such as Boston. 19 The U.S. Ofªce of Technology Assessment (OTA) has estimated that an attack with less than 100 kilograms of aerosolized anthrax spores could cause as many as 3 million casualties, rivaling the lethality of a thermonuclear weapon.
20
The creation of an offensive biological weapon capability is also relatively inexpensive, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the cost of developing defensive capabilities. According to OTA, a simple fermentation plant suitable for the production of biological warfare agents would cost $10 million to construct. 21 In 1999, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency built a small facility that could be used to produce biological warfare agents for only $1.6 million. 22 A comparison of the costs of modern state-sponsored biological warfare programs is also illustrative. In 1991, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) put the cost of Iraq's biological warfare program at $100-$200 million. against Bacillus anthracis has cost more than $250 million over the past six years, and only a fraction of the force has been fully vaccinated. 24 In addition, developing a new biodefense vaccine costs $300-$400 million and typically takes eight to ten years; transforming a pathogen into a weapon takes only two to three years.
25 Although these comparisons are somewhat crude, they indicate the highly favorable cost ratio of offense to defense in biological warfare.
the diversity of biological warfare agents Biological warfare agents are characterized by a relatively high degree of diversity, which provides terrorists and military planners with signiªcant ºexibility. The open literature discusses some thirty pathogens as having the physical and biological characteristics needed for a mass casualty-producing biological weapon. Most national biological warfare programs have focused on ten to ªfteen agents.
26 Even this short list of biological warfare agents, however, offers a range of possibilities from the lethal B. anthracis to incapacitating agents such as Coxiella burnetii (which causes Q fever) and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. Pathogens that cause contagious diseases that have been developed as biological weapons include variola major (the causative agent of smallpox) and Yersinia pestis (the cause of plague).
This list of agents, however, reºects only known threats. Unexpected or novel pathogens may also emerge as threats. U.S. experts were surprised to learn of some of the agents that Iraq and the former Soviet Union had chosen to produce and weaponize.
27 Because biological terrorism is generally less sophisticated and less demanding than the military use of biological weapons, the range of possible agents for terrorists is even larger and more varied. 28 The application of molecular biology to the development of advanced biological weapons could signiªcantly increase the diversity of biological warfare agents, but efforts along these lines are believed not to have advanced beyond the research stage.
29 As a result, because of the difªculty in assessing threat agents in a timely manner, defensive programs tend to lag behind offensive programs.
30
the ease of surprise The element of surprise is crucial for an effective biological weapon attack and is relatively easy to achieve. The small quantity of agent required for an attack, the ability to launch an attack with a spray system from several miles upwind from a target or to in some other way clandestinely deliver biological weapons, and the difªculty of detecting biological aerosols makes these weapons well suited for surprise attacks.
31 The nonspeciªc nature of the early symptoms of most diseases of concern can mask the beginning of a man-made outbreak and enhance the likelihood that such an attack will catch an adversary unprepared. Numerous exercises and simulations have demonstrated current U.S. vulnerability to clandestine attacks with biological weapons.
32
This reliance on surprise, however, exposes an Achilles' heel of biological weapons. Accurate intelligence on an adversary's biological warfare capabilities can substantially reduce the effectiveness of a biological attack by providing the defender with sufªcient information to organize public health and medical measures to mitigate the consequences of an attack.
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28. This wider range of agents, however, may not be well suited to large-scale, outdoor aerosolization and would thus be limited to aerosol dissemination inside buildings or the contamination of food and water supplies. 29. Lederberg the difficulty of defense Defensive biological warfare includes measures to prevent, mitigate, and treat the effects of a biological weapon attack. Biological defenses include vaccines and other pharmaceuticals, early warning systems, and physical protection. Given the range of available agents, the agent-speciªc nature of most defenses, the time lag required to develop new vaccines, and the ease with which an attacker can achieve surprise, defending a large population against a signiªcant number of threat agents is a daunting task that would require a huge investment. Biological weapons, however, are in some ways more vulnerable to countermeasures than high explosives, chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons. They are unique among weapon systems in that vaccines can protect soldiers and civilians before an actual attack.
33 Although licensed vaccines are currently available for only two of the most dangerous biological warfare agents-B. anthracis and variola major-the U.S. Department of Defense and the National Institutes of Health are developing more than twelve new biodefense vaccines.
34 Even though immunizing vulnerable populations against the full range of biological warfare threats is not feasible or desirable, the availability of sufªcient stockpiles of appropriate vaccines is still valuable as a deterrent to potential attackers, as a defensive measure if warning of an attack is received, as a form of postexposure prophylaxis for anthrax and smallpox, and as a reassuring symbol of preparedness.
Given the limitations of vaccines, defenses against biological weapons rely more on early detection of a biological attack and postexposure prophylaxis with antimicrobial drugs. The incubation period following infection with a pathogen, typically several days, provides a window of opportunity for the detection of a biological attack and the preparation of a response.
35 Aerosol detection devices and public health surveillance systems can provide the early warning necessary to launch a medical intervention to mitigate the consequences of a biological attack. Although current systems do not yet offer rapid,
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33. For vaccines to be effective, defenders must be able to meet the following conditions: identiªcation of the target population, knowledge of the speciªc threat agent, availability of the appropriate vaccine, and time for the vaccine to be administered to the target population before an attack. David R. accurate, and broad-spectrum detection and identiªcation capabilities, new capabilities are under development.
36 Administered promptly after infection or the onset of symptoms, antibiotics can signiªcantly reduce the morbidity and mortality of most bacterial and rickettsial agents. In contrast, there are few effective medical treatments for viral infections. Quarantine and vaccination can reduce the impact of contagious diseases such as smallpox.
37
Physical defenses prevent exposure to biological warfare agents by ªltering the air to remove dangerous particles. Simple masks, such as those used to prevent the inhalation of dust as well as more harmful materials, have been touted as being able to provide relatively inexpensive protection to civilian populations and military forces.
38 To be effective against a surprise attack, the use of these masks would have to be triggered by real-time detection of an attack, a capability that does not yet exist. Alternatively, military and health care personnel and others could wear masks when the threat of a biological attack is heightened, such as during a crisis or conºict. The prolonged use of such masks, however, would be difªcult for several reasons: growing discomfort, especially during intense physical activity; the erosion of mask integrity and ªt with rugged use; interference with face-to-face and radio communication; and the need to unmask to eat and drink.
39 Finally, masks do not prevent exposure if improperly ªtted or if the concentration of agent goes beyond a certain level. Given the inability to detect a biological attack in real time, the most feasible type of physical defenses are buildings and vehicles equipped with ªlters and positive pressure systems that prevent the inªltration of biological aerosol clouds. Because of their expense, such systems are rare outside of the military. Nonetheless, they hold much promise for defending against biological attacks because they are not agent speciªc and can function continuously. 
Proliferation to Dissatisªed Actors
Preventing the spread of biological warfare capabilities to dissatisªed actors seeking a means to challenge the status quo is extremely difªcult. The proliferation of biological weapons is facilitated by the dual-use nature of biotechnology, which also complicates veriªcation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological weapons.
41 It does not include provisions for veriªcation. In 2001, negotiations to develop a protocol to strengthen the BWC were halted after the United States announced that it would not accept the draft protocol. According to U.S. ofªcials, the proposed protocol was not intrusive enough to detect clandestine biological weapons activities, yet it was too invasive to adequately safeguard proprietary and classiªed information.
42
Actors pursuing biological weapons are motivated by a variety of factors.
43
The secrecy that shrouds biological weapons programs and the lack of reliable information regarding decisions to develop such programs, however, complicate efforts to study their motivations more thoroughly.
44 Nevertheless, an examination of the characteristics of biological weapons strongly suggests that they are attractive primarily to dissatisªed actors-whether states or terrorists. Biological weapons have military utility across the spectrum of conºict, rely on
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41. The BWC does not prohibit research on biological and toxin agents, and it allows their development and production for protective, prophylactic, or other peaceful purposes. The convention, however, does not deªne activities that constitute research or are considered protective, prophylactic, or peaceful. Barend surprise, and do not destroy property. These characteristics favor the use of such weapons in offensive operations and asymmetric strategies against stronger opponents. The outlaw status of biological weapons renders them undesirable to status quo states interested primarily in self-defense. In addition, the relative ease of accessibility, high levels of potency, and potentially huge psychological impact combine to make biological weapons attractive to extremist religious terrorist groups interested in maximizing casualties and fear. In sum, dissatisªed actors-both states and terrorists-have the opportunity and motivation to acquire these weapons.
opportunity to obtain biological weapons Traditional arms control and nonproliferation measures are signiªcantly less successful at halting the spread of biological weapons than other proscribed weapons. Effective biological disarmament faces two high hurdles: (1) the ease of acquiring the dual-use materials and technologies required to develop biological weapons, and (2) the difªculty in verifying that these resources are not being used for hostile purposes.
The dual-use nature of biotechnology means that materials, equipment, skills, and facilities designed for peaceful endeavors can also be exploited for hostile purposes. These resources are widely available on the open market and are highly sought by countries interested in economic development.
45 Export controls may slow national biological weapons programs and block access to the most advanced technologies, but they cannot prevent a determined state from acquiring a desired capability.
46 Although domestic access to dangerous pathogens in the United States has been regulated since 1996, these pathogens (with the exception of variola major) are available in nature and from a number of germ banks around the world. 47 In addition, domestic acquisition of dualuse equipment remains unfettered, greatly facilitating the development of biological weapons by terrorists.
48 This is not to say that the technical obstacles to developing a biological weapon are trivial, but given the proper materials, skills, and equipment, these obstacles are surmountable.
49
Preventing the acquisition of biological weapons through arms control and disarmament is extremely difªcult.
50 Veriªcation, the ability to conªrm whether a nation is complying with its treaty obligations, is the foundation of effective arms control and disarmament.
51 The core problem in verifying compliance with biological disarmament is that the capabilities for conducting the research, development, production, and testing of biological weapons are virtually identical to those employed by defensive programs and in legitimate civilian enterprises.
52 There are few aspects of a biological weapons program that are unique to offensive applications and are readily detectable by outsiders. Advanced biotechnologies make it unnecessary to maintain large dedicated production plants, stockpiles of bulk agents, or ªlled munitions that would provide intelligence agencies or inspectors with a "smoking gun." States suspected of failing to meet their obligations under the BWC might seek to portray certain biotechnology-related capabilities and activities that cannot be justiªed as having a civilian purpose-such as working with dangerous pathogens or experimenting with aerosols of biological agents-as being part of a defensive program permissible under the BWC. 53 The BWC does not di- rectly address these types of activities. 54 Intrusive methods aimed at uncovering evidence of the development of biological weapons will inevitably require inspections of facilities engaged in biodefense and civilian activities. Defensive and civilian activities frequently have legitimate needs for a limited degree of secrecy to protect national security and proprietary business information.
55
The safeguards for protecting sensitive information insisted on by states uninterested in developing biological weapons necessarily makes it easier for noncompliant states to hide their illicit activities. The failure of the negotiations on the BWC protocol demonstrates the difªculty of striking a widely accepted balance between the competing needs of transparency and secrecy.
Even advocates of strengthening the BWC acknowledge that a veriªcation regime that is sensitive to national security and commercial concerns will likely be unable to reliably detect violations of the treaty.
56 Instead, they contend that even a low probability of detection will deter states from violating the treaty because the costs and risks of such a violation being discovered would outweigh its beneªts. 58 The nature of international politics, however, provides a strong motivation to dissatisªed actors to pursue biological weapons, even if it means violating treaty commitments, because these weapons offer a potent means of challenging the status quo.
motivation to obtain biological weapons Biological weapons appeal to both states and terrorists seeking a powerful, terrifying, and ºexible weapon. This does not mean, however, that the widespread proliferation of these weapons is inevitable. Most states are satisªed with their overall security and position in the international system. However, deeply dissatisªed states that are willing to use violence to achieve their goals are likely to view biological weapons as a desirable force multiplier.
59 Similarly, among terrorist groups, only a limited number have the kind of radical religious philosophy or apocalyptic worldview that could justify the use of these weapons. This section challenges the myth that biological weapons lack military utility, it describes the properties of biological weapons that would appeal primarily to dissatisªed states, and it discusses the characteristics of terrorist groups interested in these weapons.
military utility of biological weapons. The widespread belief that biological weapons lack military utility is rooted in the United States' unilateral renunciation of biological weapons in 1969 and U.S. ratiªcation of the BWC in 1975. 60 The government publicly justiªed these decisions in large part on the basis of the unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences of these weapons as well as their supposed lack of military utility.
61 It made these decisions at In addition, given its formidable nuclear and conventional forces, the United States did not believe that it needed biological weapons to cause massive civilian casualties or to deter the use of biological weapons by other states. For the United States, the contribution of these weapons to achieving other missions was not worth the price of a heightened risk of proliferation. 63 It is a mistake to extrapolate from this decision, however, that biological weapons are, in the words of Thomas Schelling, "ridiculous weapons that nobody is interested in having even if the other side is foolish enough to procure them."
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64 Although biological weapons may have had marginal military utility for the United States in 1969, history has shown that this calculation is not universally applicable. Indeed, shortly after the U.S. decision to abandon these weapons, the Soviet Union decided to dramatically expand its own program and develop a new generation of biological weapons. 65 In addition, since 1972 the number of states suspected of developing these weapons has more than tripled from four to thirteen.
66
Although biological weapons have not been used in modern times, it is possible to assess their military utility based on the characteristics of these weapons, the types of weapons developed and ªelded, and the doctrines adopted. The diversity of available agents and the range of their effects could provide military planners with a ºexible weapon system capable of carrying out a range of missions against a broad selection of targets.
67 At the tactical level, the delayed effects of biological agents and the susceptibility of aerosol clouds to vagaries in meteorological and environmental conditions limit their utility to static battles of attrition. The ability of aerosol clouds to penetrate fortiªcations and buildings could provide an attacker with a means of "softening up" a hardened enemy position before an assault. 68 The risk of infecting one's troops could be minimized by vaccinating them ahead of time, employing biological weapons far from friendly forces, or using only noncontagious or short-lived agents. States lacking precision-guided munitions and cluster bombs may ªnd the cost effectiveness of these weapons attractive. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, for example, experimented with biological warheads for short-range artillery rockets during the ªnal stages of its war of attrition with Iran (1980-88).
69
Biological weapons may have their greatest military utility at the operational or theater level of warfare. 70 The goal of attacks on logistical networks, reinforcements, and command and control facilities is "to induce operational paralysis, which reduces the enemy's ability to move and coordinate forces in the theater."
71 At various times, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq developed biological weapons and doctrines for their use at the operational level of warfare.
72 Targets in the enemy's rear area could be selected so that the effects of an attack were at their height when friendly forces plan on attacking the objective. The ability of some biological agents to sicken victims for weeks or months could also outweigh the delayed effects of such agents.
73 In addition, the use of incapacitating agents instead of lethal ones might allow an aggressor to seize its objectives without provoking regime-threatening retaliation from a nuclear-armed opponent. Power projection forces that rely on a small number of large facilities with primarily civilian workforces are particularly vulnerable to such disruptive attacks.
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74 As a result, the employment of biological weapons against theater targets could serve as a potent force multiplier for a conventional military operation.
75 For this reason, the use of biological weapons as part of an asymmetric strategy to deter, prevent, or disrupt the intervention of U.S. forces in the Middle East or Northeast Asia is a major concern for American defense planners.
76
At the strategic level of warfare, the goal is to reduce the willingness or ability of the enemy to continue to prosecute a war. States can achieve this objective either through attacks targeted at civilians, with the goal of increasing pressure on the government to yield, or through attacks aimed at damaging the enemy's economy to the point where the state can no longer effectively resist.
77 Biological warfare can target civilians directly with antipersonnel agents or indirectly with antilivestock or anticrop agents that could be used against agricultural targets to reduce an enemy's food supply. The ability of biological warfare agents to be disseminated over large areas and for agents such as variola virus and y. pestis to cause epidemics makes them well suited for strategic attacks.
78 The delayed effects of biological weapons and uncertainties surrounding the downwind travel of the aerosol cloud are less important for strategic attacks that do not require precision or immediate results. In addition, the disproportionate fear that these "dreaded" weapons evoke could amplify the psychological impact of even a small-scale biological attack. 79 In their offensive programs, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq developed a range of aircraft-and missile-delivered biological weapons and doctrines for use against urban populations and agricultural targets.
80 According to John Steinbruner, Soviet military planners "might have calculated that with judicious selection of the agents and timing of their delivery, the urban populations of Western Europe might be sufªciently weakened to allow an occupying army to accomplish an otherwise impossible task." 81 attractions of biological weapons to dissatisfied states. Biological weapons are more attractive to dissatisªed states than status quo states for three reasons. First, pathogens and poisons have long been the subject of international opprobrium and efforts to control or eliminate them.
82 The 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use of chemical and biological weapons, and the BWC prohibited the development and possession of biological weapons.
83 As a result, states that are satisªed with the status quo are unlikely to pursue these weapons. Not only are such states unlikely to develop these weapons, but they are also unlikely to use them during wartime to repulse an aggressor for fear of alienating the international community or key allies.
84 On the other hand, states that plan on using violence to challenge the status quo would not likely demonstrate similar respect for international treaties. The history of chemical warfare supports this proposition. During the twentieth century, the state that initiated hostilities was always the ªrst to use lethal chemical weapons. Second, biological weapons rely on surprise for much of their effectiveness. In general, attackers, not defenders, depend on surprise to achieve their objectives. As John Mearsheimer notes, "One important advantage held by the offense is the ability to choose the main point of attack for the initial battles, to move forces there surreptitiously, and to surprise the defender."
86 Aggressors are better prepared not only to employ biological weapons but also to defend against them, because they can anticipate enemy retaliation and prepare accordingly.
87 In addition, the need for surprise reduces the utility of these weapons for other strategies such as blackmail or deterrence. According to Robert Pape, "Military strategies that depend on surprise for their effectiveness have no coercive value because they cannot be used to threaten the target with defeat."
88 Robert Jervis uses a nineteenth-century newspaper commentary to illustrate the implications of a weapon that relies on surprise: "As a measure of defense, knives, dirks, and sword canes are entirely useless. They are ªt only for attack, and all such attacks are of murderous character. Whoever carries such a weapon has prepared himself for homicide."
89
Third, biological weapons do not damage or destroy property. By degrading enemy capabilities while preserving transportation infrastructure, biological weapons could be used to facilitate the advance of a blitzkrieg-style armored attack. Such weapons could also offer an expansionist state the means of seizing valuable resources such as cities and industrial facilities without risking their destruction. To reduce the chances of contaminating the desired assets, biological agents with a high decay rate that degrade rapidly upon release could be selected, and attacks could be timed to take place shortly before sunrise to minimize the agent's half-life. likely terrorists to seek nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons for the purpose of causing mass casualties.
91 Traditional terrorists with ethnic, nationalist, or ideological grievances typically have political objectives that would be harmed if they were to use illegitimate weapons to kill large numbers of civilians. Extremist religious terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, on the other hand, have shown a proclivity for highly lethal attacks. These groups do not have broad constituencies that they risk alienating by using biological weapons, and their beliefs may permit the indiscriminant mass murder of nonbelievers. The association of disease and pestilence in sacred texts as forms of divine wrath and the dreaded nature of these weapons may further add to their appeal. In addition, some extremist groups may actually welcome severe government retaliation triggered by a biological attack as part of their plan to provoke an apocalyptic confrontation between the forces of good and evil.
92 To date, the very small number of terrorist groups that have had the motivation to use biological weapons on a large scale have been unable to develop the capability to do so. 93 A terrorist group that can combine the capability and motivation to use biological weapons will pose the novel threat of a nonstate actor capable of inºicting catastrophic damage against a perceived enemy.
94

Biological Weapons Undermine Deterrence
Despite their frequent description as a "poor man's atomic bomb," biological weapons are not well suited to serving as a strategic deterrent.
95 Moreover, the accessibility of biological weapons and the ability to conduct anonymous biological attacks reduce a state's ability to deter the use of these weapons.
poor suitability for strategic deterrence The comparison of biological weapons with nuclear weapons is not without basis. Under the right conditions, a biological attack could kill as many people as a nuclear device. 96 This similarity is the basis for most analyses that suggest that biological weapons will have similar political effects as nuclear weapons.
97
According to Susan Martin, biological weapons enable even small states to deter threats to their vital interests and intervention by major powers. Because biological weapons are more easily acquired than nuclear weapons, Martin predicts that the beneªts of the "biological revolution" will be more widespread and have an even more profound impact on international affairs than the nuclear revolution.
98 I argue that despite their potential lethality, biological weapons do not possess the characteristics necessary for an effective strategic deterrent. They may, however, serve as an in-kind deterrent or contribute to a state's general deterrence posture. Nevertheless, the spread of biological warfare capabilities is not likely to exert a stabilizing inºuence on international peace and security, as Martin asserts.
99
The prerequisite for strategic deterrence is the capability of the target of a surprise attack to retaliate by inºicting unacceptable damage against its attacker.
100 During the Cold War, the possession of such forces by both superpowers gave rise to the situation of mutual deterrence described as mutual assured destruction. The nuclear revolution is a function not only of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons but also of their reliability, the lack of effective defenses, and the availability of survivable delivery systems. an adversary, they are unable to offer states an "assured" capability for doing so; this shortfall undermines their suitability as a strategic deterrent. Biological weapons differ from nuclear weapons in two important ways that raise doubts about the applicability of strategic deterrence theory to biological warfare.
The ªrst signiªcant difference involves the level of uncertainty associated with the employment of these weapons. Based on a deep understanding of the fundamental scientiªc principles underlying nuclear weapons as well as extensive operational and experimental experience with them, experts have been able to document the levels of thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and blast overpressure that cause speciªed effects in personnel and matériel.
102 Nuclear weapons deliver instantaneous and overwhelming destruction; the effects of biological weapons, on the other hand, are delayed, variable, and difªcult to predict. There are ways to reduce this uncertainty by carefully selecting the agent, the delivery system, and the conditions under which an attack is conducted. States that plan on using their biological weapons as a strategic deterrent, however, may not have the luxury of choosing the time and place for a retaliatory strike.
103 In addition, the lack of operational experience with these weapons and the inability to realistically simulate their effects (short of massive human experimentation) impede the ability of states to substantially reduce this level of uncertainty.
The second major difference between nuclear and biological weapons concerns the availability of defenses. There are no effective defenses against the effects of a nuclear attack. As discussed earlier, however, there are countermeasures that can be taken prior to or following a biological attack. This creates two problems for relying on biological weapons as a strategic deterrent. First, the availability of defenses that could signiªcantly mitigate the consequences of a biological attack is likely to reduce the conªdence of states in their ability to reliably inºict unacceptable damage against an adversary in a retaliatory strike. The full panoply of defenses need not be deployed constantly at full readiness because the very availability of these defenses may be sufªcient to dissuade a state from calculating that it can inºict unacceptable damage. Although civilian populations will remain more vulnerable to biological weapons than military forces, damage limitation remains a viable option for larger,
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102. Samuel Gladstone and Dolan J. Philip, eds., Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1977) . 103. In contrast, a state contemplating a ªrst strike or surprise attack with biological weapons would have more ºexibility in determining when, where, and how to employ these weapons. more advanced states facing less sophisticated adversaries. The December 2002 initiative by the United States to vaccinate nearly 1 million soldiers, public health ofªcials, and medical workers against smallpox in advance of the looming war with Iraq illustrates how states can adopt precautionary measures to blunt the effectiveness of an anticipated threat.
104
Second, the availability of defenses against biological weapons also places a premium on surprise. Surprise requires strict secrecy, which reduces a state's ability to issue credible threats to inºict unacceptable damage against an adversary.
105 Credible deterrent threats would entail revealing details about the nature of a state's biological weapons capabilities. These revelations could reduce the effectiveness of these weapons by compromising the element of surprise and allowing the defender to take appropriate countermeasures. North Korea in the late 1960s and Iraq in the early 1990s employed deterrent strategies based on biological weapons only to have them compromised by secrecy.
106 Regardless of whether a state adopts a strategy of biological deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment, neither will deter potential adversaries if the intention and capabilities to implement the strategy are unknown.
Secrecy may be an inexpensive and attractive way for gaining security for strategic forces, but it is also risky.
107 Forces that depend on secrecy for their protection are vulnerable to intelligence breakthroughs by an adversary. The loss of secrecy could be massive and occur without warning. If a defender has inside information about an attacker's intentions and capabilities, it could seek to develop and stockpile new vaccines and treatments, immunize the atrisk population, distribute protective masks and treatments, enhance public health surveillance, and take other precautions that could substantially mitigate the impact of a biological weapon attack. Although such information is difªcult to acquire, there have been a number of cases where high-level ofªcials knowledgeable about their nation's biological weapons program have defected.
108
the difficulties of deterring biological attacks The accessibility of biological weapons to a diverse set of actors and the ease of covert attacks complicate efforts to deter their use. The proliferation of biological weapons to nondeterrable actors and the prospect of anonymous attacks could undermine reliance on deterrence as a security strategy and lead states to adopt preventive or preemptive strategies.
accessibility of biological weapons. Because of the global diffusion of dual-use biotechnology, biological weapons can be developed by a larger and more diverse group of actors than can nuclear weapons. Even states that are incapable of effectively managing the investment of large amounts of human, ªnancial, and physical capital over the ten years typically required to produce nuclear weapons may still be able to develop biological weapons.
109 In 1993, the Ofªce of Technology Assessment estimated that more than 100 states had the capability to develop biological weapons.
110 This greater accessibility raises the risk that biological weapons could be acquired by an actor that is insensitive to costs, values gains more than the status quo, and grossly misperceives the interests or capabilities of others. Such actors can be difªcult to deter because they "do not feel the pain of punishment, or they are willing to take great
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108. In 1989 Vladimir Pasechnik, the director of a major Soviet biological weapons research institute, defected to the United Kingdom. In 1992 Kenneth Alibek, a former deputy director of Biopreparat, the Soviet Union's biological weapons research and development agency, defected to the United States. In 1995 Hussein Kamel, the head of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, defected to Jordan. Tom pains to gain their goals, or they fail to see the punishment coming."
111 The primary actors of concern in this regard are terrorists.
112 Although no terrorist group has yet succeeded in developing a mass casualty-producing biological weapon, groups such as Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaeda have demonstrated the ability to employ sophisticated weapons, the desire to cause mass casualties, and an interest in using disease as a weapon.
113 Moreover, the possibility that a state sometime in the future might demonstrate some of these qualities cannot be excluded.
114
prospect of anonymous use. Biological weapons are relatively easy to develop in secret, are well suited for covert delivery, and do not provide signatures that can be used to identify the attacker. Aum Shinrikyo's dissemination of biological agents in Japan on a dozen separate occasions in the early 1990s went undetected until they were revealed years later during the trial of the cult's leadership. 115 As the Federal Bureau of Investigation's inability to identify the perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks has demonstrated, forensic capabilities in this ªeld are limited. 116 The potential accessibility of biological weapon capabilities to large number of actors also complicates efforts to identify the perpetrator of a biological attack. If a state or terrorist group believes that it could conduct an attack anonymously and thereby escape retaliation, deterrence would be ineffective.
A second potential consequence of the anonymous use of biological weapons is catalytic war: a war between two states secretly initiated by a third party. The spread of nuclear weapons in the 1960s created concern that a third party could attack either superpower and make it appear to be the work of its rival, sparking a crisis or war. 117 This worry faded in the 1970s with the signing of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which helped to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons, and the advent of advanced early warning systems that allowed the superpowers to detect and track aircraft and ballistic missiles, the primary delivery systems for nuclear weapons. No such measures exist today with regards to biological weapons, so the possibility of a catalytic war sparked by the use of these weapons remains a possibility. For example, a hostile state or terrorist group in the Middle East could stage an attack on U.S. forces in the region that points to another state as the culprit.
prevention and preemption. States may adopt preventive or preemptive strategies to neutralize perceived threats posed by the prospect of anonymous biological attacks or the acquisition of biological weapons by nondeterrable actors.
118 After the September 11 terrorist attacks, preventive and preemptive strategies became central to U.S. national security planning.
119 These strategies, however, ªrst emerged during President Bill Clinton's administration in response to the threat of mass casualty terrorism. In 1995, the White House issued a presidential decision directive stating that the acquisition of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by terrorists was "unacceptable." According to the directive, "There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S."
120 This policy was ªrst implemented on August 20, 1998, when the United States launched cruise missiles at the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which ofªcials believed was linked to the development of chemical weapons for al-Qaeda.
121 Despite concerns within the administration about the legal and intelligence justiªcations for the attack, "the perception of imminent danger was powerful enough to overcome these concerns. At the Principals meeting, [National Security Adviser] Sandy Berger asked, 'What if we do not hit it [al-Shifa] and then, after an attack, nerve gas is released in the New York City subway? What will we say then? '" 122 Although this incident involved terrorist acquisition of chemical (not biological) weapons, it indicates
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118. The goal of a preventive attack is to thwart a state or terrorist group from developing a threatening capability. Preemptive strikes are conducted when an enemy attack appears imminent. Richard K. Betts how states may respond to the specter of terrorist acquisition of even more lethal weapons. Preventive and preemptive attacks against suspected biological weapons facilities present signiªcant intelligence, military, and diplomatic challenges. The potential consequences of a biological attack and the limitations of defensive and deterrent strategies, however, may inºuence a decisionmaker's calculation that the risks of inaction outweigh the costs of action.
Obstruction of Civilian Oversight
The intense secrecy that shrouds biological warfare programs distorts political decisionmaking and restricts civilian oversight. Secrecy also leads to the compartmentalization of information and increases the likelihood of corruption and abuse by program managers. In announcing the results of a review of U.S. chemical and biological warfare programs in 1969, President Richard Nixon stated, "This has been the ªrst thorough review ever undertaken of this subject at the Presidential level. . . . I recall during the eight years that I sat on the National Security Council in the Eisenhower Administration that these subjects, insofar as an appraisal of what the United States had, what our capability was, what other nations had, were really considered taboo."
123 Within the obsessively secretive Soviet Union, the biological weapons program was "one of the best-guarded secrets."
124 It operated under the highest security classiªcation in the Soviet system, even higher than the nuclear weapons program.
125 Although all weapon programs are subject to some level of secrecy to prevent adversaries from learning about capabilities and vulnerabilities, the secrecy surrounding biological weapons programs has been unusually high.
126
States pursuing biological weapons have several reasons to subject these programs to stringent secrecy. The general revulsion against biological warfare has motivated states to conceal their research into these weapons. As a British study of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) policy noted, "For in order to avoid provoking the critics of CBW in peacetime, while forearming itself against charges of shortsightedness in case war should ªnd the country unable to retaliate against CBW, a responsible government can hardly be blamed for procuring the weapons but keeping them dark."
127 Secrecy has become even more important since the creation of the 1972 BWC, which reinforces the norm against developing these weapons and raises the political costs of the discovery of a weapons program. Finally, there is a strategic motivation for wrapping biological weapons in secrecy. Military capabilities that strongly favor the offense, particularly those that rely on surprise, engender higher levels of secrecy.
128
The intense secrecy surrounding biological weapons programs is inimical to effective decisionmaking and oversight. As described in the literature on opaque proliferation, the strict secrecy surrounding covert nuclear weapons programs leads to compartmentalization that restricts the information available to senior ofªcials about the nature and conduct of these programs and limits the range and knowledge of participants involved in such oversight.
129
In addition, secrecy exacerbates existing information asymmetries between political leaders and military ofªcers or scientists who run biological weapons programs. Such asymmetries enable subordinates to operate with too much autonomy, avoid accountability by concealing potentially embarrassing or damaging information from their superiors, and hinder the implementation of new policies with which they disagree. Large information asymmetries may allow program managers to take actions for their own beneªt or for the beneªt of their organization that are against the interests of their superiors. 130 Thus, programs escape review, decisions are made with incomplete or inaccurate information, and the exercise of appropriate oversight is hindered.
Three brief cases illustrate the adverse effects of secrecy on the management of major biological warfare programs. In 1975, a congressional investigation exposed a secret stockpile of toxins at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that should have been destroyed years earlier when the United States decided to terminate its offensive biological warfare program. 131 The toxins were the result of cooperation between the CIA and the U.S. Army to develop biological
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agents and weapons for clandestine operations. An internal CIA review of the program found that it was "characterized by a compartmentation [sic] that was extreme even by CIA standards."
132 In contrast to the review of the Defense Department's plans to destroy its stocks of agents and munitions by appropriate federal, state, and local agencies, the destruction of the CIA's holdings of biological and toxin agents stored at Fort Detrick, Maryland, was not subject to any external oversight. As a result, CIA scientists were able to retain a small stockpile of toxins despite the presidential decision to destroy all such agents. The corrosive effects of too much secrecy on oversight was demonstrated again in 2001, when it was reported that the CIA and Defense Department were conducting classiªed projects to develop limited offensive capabilities for defensive purposes and that some of these activities had not been reported to the National Security Council or included in annual conªdence-building declarations to the United Nations.
133
Political leaders in Moscow in the 1990s experienced problems in obtaining accurate information from the military regarding biological warfare activities, making informed decisions about the future of the program, and ensuring the implementation of new policies. For example, in May 1990, under pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a secret decree halting the research, development, and testing activities of Biopreparat, an ostensibly civilian organization also responsible for the development and production of biological weapons. Gen. Yury Kalinin, the head of Biopreparat, and his allies in the military manipulated the formulation and implementation of the decree, however, to preserve as much of the program as possible. The ªnal decree included a loophole inserted by Kalinin that allowed the continued funding of the full range of Biopreparat's activities. Kalinin then withheld the decree from the directors of Biopreparat's institutes so that they could act on it only under orders from headquarters, which were not forthcoming. As a result, the decree had a limited impact on Biopreparat's activities except to better conceal them from the civilians in the Kremlin. 134 According to Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador to Moscow from 1987 to 1991, "From their behavior, I think the people at the top [in the Kremlin] probably did not know everything. There is plenty of evidence that shows these people were not able to get the information they wanted, because the system was so secret and the political authorities had so little control over the military and KGB. And they had no reliable way to check up on the information they did get." 135 Similar problems plagued efforts by President Boris Yeltsin to dismantle the former Soviet biological weapons program and bring Russia into compliance with the BWC.
136
Problems of control and oversight also beset South Africa's chemical and biological weapons program that ran from 1981 to 1993. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission that investigated the program, called Project Coast, found that the military committee charged with oversight was "grossly negligent in approving programmes and allocating large sums of money for activities of which they had no understanding, and which they made no effort to understand."
137 This mismanagement resulted in scientiªc and ªnancial fraud by a "nepotistic, self-serving and self-enriching group of people, misled by those who had a technical grasp of what was happening."
138 In addition, the program managers misled President F.W. de Klerk and later President Nelson Mandela about the offensive orientation of the program and its role in assassination operations. 139 As a result of this lack of oversight, the program's documents and materials were not properly destroyed or accounted for when the program was terminated and thus continued to present a proliferation risk many years later.
140
These cases demonstrate the range of pathologies that secrecy can introduce into decisionmaking and oversight regarding biological weapons programs. The security implications are subtle but disturbing. Biological weapons programs managed by highly autonomous organizations could evade civilian oversight, manipulate ambiguous intelligence on foreign biological warfare ac-
Pathogens as Weapons 113
tivities or other information to mislead senior ofªcials, and resist efforts to comply with international obligations. This lack of oversight could be especially dangerous if it allows unsafe or unauthorized experiments to develop new or improved biological weapons. In addition, decisionmakers denied the proper information and expertise may be poorly equipped to assess the strengths and limitations of these weapons. This in turn could lead them to miscalculate their ability to use these weapons covertly to avoid provoking regime-threatening retaliation or place undue conªdence in them as a strategic deterrent. Finally, the lack of oversight increases the risk that such programs could become the source of expertise, materials, or weapons for terrorists or other states.
Flawed Threat Assessment
Accurate and timely intelligence has long been regarded as a crucial element in defending against biological weapons. In 1969, President Nixon stated that the unilateral renunciation of biological weapons would not "leave us vulnerable to surprise by an enemy who does not observe these rational restraints. Our intelligence community will continue to watch carefully the nature and extent of the biological programs of others."
141 Strict secrecy and the dual-use nature of biotechnology, however, make biological weapon programs a notoriously difªcult target for intelligence agencies. According to the CIA's top nonproliferation analyst in 1999, "Biological weapons (BW) pose, arguably, the most daunting challenge for intelligence collectors and analysts."
142 Biological threat assessments must take into account not only capabilities that are challenging to monitor but also intentions that are even more difªcult to discern. As a result, intelligence on foreign biological warfare programs is usually severely deªcient. Indeed, the most signiªcant intelligence breakthroughs have resulted from defections by knowledgeable insiders.
143 Only such insiders can provide the information on intent that is required for a comprehensive understanding of a state's biological warfare program.
144 Assessing the biological threat posed by terrorists is likely to be even more difªcult given the intensively secretive nature of such organizations. It is possible that a terrorist group with the motivation and capability to use these weapons will emerge with little or no warning.
145
The historical record is replete with ºawed biological threat assessments that have resulted in signiªcant overestimates and underestimates of an adversary's biological warfare capabilities and intentions. During World War II, both the Allied and Axis powers had poor intelligence on the facilities, scientists, and agents involved in the biological warfare programs of the other side.
146
The U.S. military grossly underestimated the Japanese biological warfare program until it was able to interview personnel captured during and after the war. 147 In contrast, because of their misreading of German intentions, the Allies' fear of a German biological warfare program was greatly exaggerated. 148 Nonetheless, this fear spurred crash programs by the Allies to develop a range of defensive and offensive biological warfare capabilities.
149
During the Cold War, the United States and its allies also lacked a clear understanding of the Soviet biological weapons program. According to a 1970 U.S. interagency report, "Useful intelligence on actual production, weaponization and stockpiling remains nonexistent, and information on the Soviet biological warfare program remains incomplete in almost all important details."
150 This lack of intelligence led to an underestimation of the size and sophistication of the Soviet biological warfare program that was revealed in 1989
Pathogens as Weapons 115 rounding the trailers highlights the ambiguity inherent in dual-use technologies and the challenges that this poses for conducting accurate and convincing threat assessments.
The difªculty in conducting such assessments has several implications. First, without adequate intelligence, it is more difªcult to develop and deploy effective defenses. The agent-speciªc nature of most medical countermeasures and diagnostic and detection systems requires advance knowledge of the agents that an adversary is developing. As a result, it is "an established principle that offensive developments will always lead and drive defensive developments."
158 In addition, without reliable intelligence indicating that an adversary's biological warfare program poses a signiªcant threat, it may not be possible to mobilize the resources for researching and ªelding defenses against the threat.
Second, without credible intelligence, it is much more difªcult to rally domestic and international support for diplomatic efforts to bring states into compliance with their biological disarmament obligations.
159 As the investigations into the Soviet and Iraqi biological weapons programs demonstrated, accurate intelligence is also crucial for planning and conducting inspections, as well as analyzing their results. 160 Third, in the absence of reliable intelligence, governments may engage in worst-case planning and undertake an exaggerated reaction to perceived threats. 161 In light of the similarities between offensive and defensive biological warfare activities, interpreting uncertain intelligence in this way could lead
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to a security dilemma where states take actions to improve their own defense that inadvertently threaten other states. 162 As the number and size of national biological defense programs increases in response to the threat of biological terrorism, other states may perceive these activities as threatening, thereby providing a justiªcation for initiating or continuing a biological weapons program. Timely and dependable intelligence will not negate the threat posed by biological weapons, but it will help to calibrate defensive and diplomatic responses to these threats and reduce the likelihood of counterproductive actions.
Rebuttals and Responses
There are three possible objections to the preceding analysis. The ªrst objection is that terrorists, not states, pose the predominant biological threat.
163 This article's state-centric perspective may appear to be outmoded in the postSeptember 11 world, but it is both important and practical. National programs to develop biological weapons are both more numerous and more advanced than those of their terrorist counterparts. In addition, states that are hostile to the United States and its allies sponsor many of these programs. Further, as a result of declassiªcation, defections, and investigations, there is much more information available regarding the history and conduct of national biological warfare programs.
The second potential rebuttal is that biological weapons will have their greatest impact on the relations and conºicts of smaller and nonnuclear states. This objection is based on the false premise that these are the only types of states interested in biological weapons and that the strategic consequences of these weapons can be contained to this group of states. Virtually all of the nuclear states, however, developed biological weapons at some point-for purposes ranging from counterinsurgency to operational military employment to strategic attack. Even nuclear states with weak conventional forces may be tempted to use these weapons as force multipliers. In addition, possession of International Security 28:3 118 nuclear weapons will not necessarily deter the use of biological weapons by actors that do not believe they will be identiªed or that are insensitive to retaliatory threats. Moreover, the use of biological weapons in a regional conºict is likely to involve the ally of a major power and lead to outside intervention or escalation. Like a contagious disease, the security implications of biological weapons will affect some states more than others, but they spread easily and no state is immune.
The third likely objection is that because biological weapons have been used so rarely, this restraint is likely to hold. Therefore, despite their potential military utility, biological weapons will remain marginal in most states' national security calculations. Although modern biological weapons based on aerosol dissemination technology have not been successfully employed by states or terrorists, cruder weapons have been used in modern times. 164 There are also disturbing signs that the normative, operational, and political restraints that have limited the use of these weapons are weaker now then they were thirty years ago. Most of the states currently suspected of developing biological weapons are parties to the 1972 BWC, which illustrates the permeability of the normative barrier to proliferation. 165 The 2001 anthrax letter attacks, the ªrst overt use of biological weapons, weakened the taboo against using disease as a weapon. In addition, advanced biotechnologies that can ameliorate problems in safely producing, storing, and handling these weapons as well as effectively employing them in combat are becoming increasingly available.
166 Further-more, the overwhelming conventional superiority of Western states and their allies provides dissatisªed actors with strong incentives to employ biological weapons as part of an asymmetric strategy that may outweigh the political and strategic hazards of using these weapons. 167 Leaders may calculate that they can use their biological weapons as force multipliers to accomplish a fait accompli, tailor their use of these weapons to avoid provoking regimethreatening retaliation, or conduct anonymous attacks and avoid retaliation. Extremist religious terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and its afªliates that have emerged as direct threats to the United States and its allies are among those most likely to resort to unconventional weapons in their drive to inºict as many casualties and as much terror as possible. As with nuclear weapons, the lack of large-scale use of biological weapons since 1945 is a cause for celebration, but not grounds for complacency.
Conclusion
The global diffusion of dual-use biotechnology, coupled with strong incentives for revisionist states and extremist terrorist groups to harness this technology for malevolent purposes, poses a severe challenge to international peace and stability in the twenty-ªrst century. As biological weapons become more capable and more accessible to a wider range of players, the strategic consequences outlined in this article-proliferation to dissatisªed actors, undermining of deterrence, obstruction of civilian oversight, and ºawed threat assessmentsshould become more evident. This analysis yields four policy prescriptions for countering the growing danger posed by biological weapons.
First, defenses against biological weapons should be strengthened to make these weapons less effective and less likely to be used in future conºicts. Robust defenses against the most threatening agents and further improvements in vaccines, detection, physical defense, diagnosis, surveillance, therapy, and forensics could create sufªcient uncertainty in the minds of potential attackers about the likelihood of success to deter such attacks. 168 Besides the sub-stantial investment that must be made in research and development, medical countermeasures need to be stockpiled, and local public health and medical communities and military units need to be prepared to detect and respond to a biological attack. 169 At the same time, these efforts should be accompanied by transparency measures to ensure that these defensive programs are not misinterpreted by other states as threatening. 170 The use of biological weapons anywhere would further erode the taboo against these weapons everywhere. Therefore, these defensive innovations should also be made available internationally to reduce the incentives for any actor to develop or use these weapons. 171 To the extent that the tools and technologies developed to defend against biological weapons are also useful in combating naturally occurring infectious diseases, this initiative would have humanitarian as well as security beneªts.
Second, the capability to detect clandestine offensive activities and distinguish them from defensive and civilian activities is needed for three reasons:
(1) to establish a foundation for veriªcation, (2) to provide policymakers with insights into the capabilities and intentions of other states, and (3) to improve the effectiveness of defenses. Accurate and timely intelligence is crucial to achieving these objectives. Therefore, the United States and its allies should enhance the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding biological warfare programs by aggressively seeking human sources, exploiting open sources, and recruiting more academic and industry biotechnology experts. In addition, a major research and evaluation program is required to develop techniques and technologies that could be employed to investigate allegations of noncompliance on an ad hoc basis or as part of a veriªcation regime. The difªculty that the United States has had in conªrming its prewar intelligence on Iraq's biological weapons program highlights the urgent need for improvements in this ªeld.
Third, the barrier to the acquisition of biological weapons should be raised by limiting access to dangerous pathogens, techniques, and research results applicable to the development of biological weapons. 172 In addition, given the sophistication of the former Soviet biological weapons program, preventing the proliferation of biological weapons-related resources from Russia is essential. 173 Similar projects could also be useful in South Africa, Iraq, and other states unable to fully dismantle their former biological weapons programs. Enhanced cooperative nonproliferation efforts would complement efforts to strengthen biological defenses by slowing the progress of offensive programs and employing former weapons scientists in civilian or defensive research. These measures would not be able to prevent proliferation, but they could complicate terrorist access to biological weapons based on traditional pathogens and hinder the development of more sophisticated weapons by states.
Fourth, the norm against the development and use of biological weapons should be strengthened to reduce the motivations of states and terrorists to acquire these weapons and gain operational experience with them. One valuable step in this direction would be an international agreement that the development, production, transfer, and use of biological weapons, including unethical human experimentation, represents a crime against humanity and that perpetrators would be subject to international arrest and prosecution. 
